Prominence, complexity, and pricing by Chioveanu, Ioana
International Journal of Industrial Organization 63 (2019) 551–582 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijio 
Prominence, complexity, and pricing  
Ioana Chioveanu 
Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University London, 
Uxbridge UB8 3PH, UK 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 23 May 2018 
Revised 30 October 2018 
Accepted 29 December 2018 
Available online 16 January 2019 
JEL classiﬁcation: 
D03 
D43 
L13 
Keywords: 
Oligopoly markets 
Consumer confusion 
Prominence 
Price complexity 
Price dispersion 
a b s t r a c t 
This paper analyzes prominence in a homogeneous product 
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 1. Introduction 
Price complexity is a common feature of many markets, including those for retail 
ﬁnancial and banking products, and retail supply of gas and electricity. It stems from the
use of multi-part tariﬀs or partitioned prices, involved or technical language, or diﬀerent 
price formats or information disclosure methods. A main concern is that complex pricing 
stiﬂes competition by making it harder for consumers to understand ﬁrms’ oﬀers and 
identify the best deal. 
The 2015 UK Competition and Market Authority investigation of the retail banking 
market found that “[t]here are barriers to accessing and assessing information on Personal 
Current Account charges” and “overdraft charges are particularly diﬃcult to compare 
across banks, due to both the complexity and diversity of the banks’ charging structures”.
The 2011 report by the UK Independent Commission on Banking mentions “evidence 
that complexity in pricing structures makes it diﬃcult for consumers to receive go o d
value”. The 2007 EC study of EU mortgage credit markets and Wo o dward and Hall’s
2012 study of US mortgage markets echo these concerns. 1 
Price complexity increases the time (or eﬀort) consumers need to make a choice and
the level of cognitive abilities and sophistication required to ﬁnd the best oﬀer. So, it may
lead to consumer confusion and allow homogeneous product sellers to soften price compe- 
tition and increase their proﬁts. 2 Experimental research indicates that more fragmented 
multi-part tariﬀs can create confusion and lead to suboptimal consumer choices (see, for 
instance, Kalaycı and Potters, 2011; Kalaycı, 2015 ). These ﬁndings are consistent with 
evidence from the marketing literature that partitioned (or involved) pricing makes it 
diﬃcult for consumers to compare competing oﬀers ( Greenleaf et al., 2016 reviews related
work). Evidence of behavioral biases has also been found for US retail ﬁnance products
(mortgage brokerage, loans, and credit card services) by Wo o dward and Hall (2012) and
Stango and Zinman (2009a,b) . 3 
In some markets where price complexity leads to consumer confusion, the choices of 
confused buyers are aﬀected by ﬁrm prominence, which may be due to higher brand
recognition (e.g., for a pioneer or incumbent product or an intensely advertised one), 
to product recommendations made by an expert, agent, or other consumers, to a more
salient location (at eye-level, in a display, or at the top of an online search-outcome list),
or to consumers’ loyalty to an already familiar brand. See Armstrong et al. (2009) for
a discussion of empirical evidence on prominence. For instance, consumers who shop for 
a mortgage or for insurance may be biased towards considering their current-account 1 Carlin (2009) discusses empirical evidence of price complexity in ﬁnancial markets and concludes that 
“many of the households who purchase retail ﬁnancial products do not understand what they are buying 
and how much they are paying for these go o ds”. 
2 When facing complex tariﬀs/markets, some consumers may rationally opt out of information processing 
due to its high cost. Or, they may be unable to deal with the complexity because they have p o or numeracy 
skills and/or misjudge the information. 
3 See also Campbell (2016) for a thorough discussion of consumer ignorance in household ﬁnance. 
I. Chioveanu / International Journal of Industrial Organization 63 (2019) 551–582 553 
b  
t
 
a  
W  
m  
i  
b  
e  
t
 
i  
o  
s  
m  
i  
d  
h
 
t  
c  
p  
c  
ﬁ  
l  
d  
p  
t
 
l  
a  
t  
s
H
a
B
t
i
c
m
pank. In retail energy markets that were previously monopolized, consumers may favor
he ‘familiar’ regional incumbent over new entrants. 4 
This paper explores the relationship between price complexity as an obfuscation device
nd ﬁrm prominence and its implications in otherwise homogeneous product markets.
e analyze the impact of prominence on ﬁrms’ pricing and complexity choices and on
arket outcomes. In our model, a prominent seller and its rival compete for a unit mass of
dentical consumers with unit demands. Firms simultaneously and independently choose
oth their prices and price-complexity levels. The timing reﬂects the fact that in many
nvironments, including banking and ﬁnancial markets, ﬁrms can change relatively easily
he price formats or the technical language employed in their price disclosures. 
We formalize price complexity by allowing each ﬁrm to select a level from a closed
nterval. A ﬁrm’s choice of complexity aﬀects consumers’ ability to understand its price
ﬀer. As a result, the ﬁrms’ complexity choices aﬀect market composition: some con-
umers are experts and purchase the lowest-price product, while others are confused. 5 A
arginal increase in a ﬁrm’s complexity level increases the share of confused consumers
n the market. Confused consumers are unable to assess the ﬁrms’ prices and make ran-
om choices, but are relatively more likely to select the prominent product as it enjoys
igher recognition. 6 
We show that the nature of the equilibrium depends on the relative prominence of the
wo ﬁrms. Both ﬁrms have to balance conﬂicting incentives when setting their prices: to
ompete aggressively for the experts and to exploit the confused consumers. But the less
rominent ﬁrm has stronger incentives to compete aggressively as it has a smaller base of
onfused consumers. In equilibrium, this friction rules out pure strategy pricing, so both
rms randomize on prices. Moreover, the prominent ﬁrm also randomizes between the
owest and the highest price complexity levels and, for moderate levels of prominence, so
oes the less prominent seller. However, if the prominence level is high enough, the less
rominent seller chooses the lowest complexity for sure as it beneﬁts more from market
ransparency. 
In equilibrium, whenever a ﬁrm randomizes on complexity, there is a positive re-
ationship between prices and complexity levels. 7 When setting a relatively low price,
 ﬁrm beneﬁts from a lower complexity level as this is associated with a higher frac-
ion of experts. In contrast, when a ﬁrm sets a relatively high price, it may beneﬁt4 Hortaçsu et al. (2017) show that inattention and incumbent brands’ advantages are sources of con- 
umer inertia in the Texan residential electricity market. Analysing Mexico’s private social security market, 
astings et al. (2017) show that ﬁrms’ advertising and sales spending (which can be related to prominence) 
ﬀects low-income or price-inelastic consumers’ choices. See also Giulietti et al. (2014) for evidence from 
ritish electricity markets. 
5 This model is open to a default-bias interpretation whereby consumers are initially assigned to one ﬁrm, 
he prominent ﬁrm has an initial advantage (i.e., a larger base of consumers), and the extent of consumer 
nertia (i.e., the share of buyers who uphold their default option) is endogenously determined by ﬁrms’ 
omplexity choices. 
6 When confused, the consumers may use intermediaries who steer them towards the prominent product, 
ay rely on persuasive advertisements, or may have stronger default biases. 
7 Armstrong and Chen (2009) and Chioveanu (2012) identify positive relationships between prices and 
roduct qualities in models where ﬁrms randomize on both dimensions. 
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 from choosing a high complexity level, provided that it serves a large enough fraction of
confused consumers. 
The market outcomes reﬂect the diﬀerences in product salience. The prominent seller 
makes higher proﬁts, chooses the highest complexity level with higher probability than 
the rival, sets a lower cut-oﬀ price below which prices are associated with the lowest com-
plexity, and cho oses the monop oly price with p ositive probability. As it sells to a larger
share of confused consumers, the salient ﬁrm is more likely to choose high complexity 
and also, for a given complexity level, its incentive to set a high price is stronger. The
less prominent seller’s price is always below the monopoly level and its average price is
lower than that of the rival. 8 
An increase in the level of prominence may lead to lower industry proﬁt and higher
consumer surplus. Such an increase aﬀects ﬁrms’ pricing directly, as it reallocates the 
confused consumers in favour of the salient ﬁrm. Moreover, it has an indirect eﬀect on
pricing as it aﬀects ﬁrms’ probabilities of choosing lowest complexity. As a result, our
framework highlights a novel channel through which prominence aﬀects market outcomes, 
related to the cut-oﬀ structure of ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies. An increase in prominence 
(weakly) increases the probability with which the less prominent ﬁrm chooses the lowest 
complexity, while it strictly decreases the corresponding probability of the salient ﬁrm. 
This tension underlies the non-monotonicity of consumer surplus in prominence. One 
implication is that in an environment where less prominent ﬁrms (e.g. new entrants) 
increase their relative salience (for instance, through advertising investments or sales 
eﬀorts), this could be detrimental to consumers. 
Conditional on choosing lowest complexity, the prominent ﬁrm’s average price is lower. 
In this sense, confused consumers’ bias for the prominent seller is consistent with the
ranking of the average prices conditional on low complexity. In an extension, we show
that a qualitatively robust cut-oﬀ mixed strategy equilibrium exists for more general 
confusion technologies if the marginal eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s price complexity increases in the
rival’s complexity choice. 9 
In spite of their prevalence, price complexity and ﬁrm prominence have only recently 
received attention in the economics literature. To analyze these phenomena, a recent 
stream of theoretical research develops the framework in Varian (1980) , by endogenizing 
consumer heterogeneity. Carlin (2009) examines a homogeneous product market where 
identical ﬁrms compete in both prices and price complexity levels. Strategic price com- 
plexity leads to consumer confusion and softens price competition. Confused consumers 
make random choices, so each ﬁrm is equally likely to be selected. His ﬁndings are consis-
tent with observed patterns in retail ﬁnancial markets, such as price disp ersion, p ositive
mark-ups, and higher prices in more fragmented environments. Our analysis focuses on 8 Gurun et al. (2016) show that lenders who advertise more sell more expensive mortgages and that the 
eﬀect is stronger for less sophisticated consumers. 
9 In the working paper, we also verify the robustness of our qualitative results in a mo diﬁed mo del where 
expert consumers are biased towards the prominent ﬁrm’s product (i.e. willing to pay a premium for it so 
long as the price is below their valuation), see Chioveanu (2017) . 
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che interaction between price complexity and prominence, and shows that the latter has
n impact on the equilibrium pattern. Speciﬁcally, we identify conditions where only the
rominent ﬁrm randomizes in price complexity levels and show that consumer surplus
ay be non-monotonic in prominence. 
Piccione and Spiegler (2012) study a duopoly market where consumers are initially
ssigned to one ﬁrm (their default option) and make price comparisons with a probabil-
ty which depends on ﬁrms’ chosen price formats. They consider a more general frame
tructure and identify a necessary and suﬃcient condition for ﬁrms to earn max–min
roﬁts in equilibrium. The analyses in Carlin (2009) and Piccione and Spiegler (2012,
ection IV.B) focus on the polar case where both ﬁrms are equally prominent. Spiegler
2011 , Chapter 10.4) provides a treatment for the other polar case where all consumers
re initially assigned to the same ﬁrm, so there is extreme prominence. By allowing for
rbitrary salience levels, our analysis ﬁlls the gap between these two polar cases, and
hows that consumer surplus is not monotonic in prominence. 
The symmetric oligopoly analysis in Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) shows that the equi-
ibrium pattern depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of frame diﬀerentiation and frame
omplexity as sources of consumer confusion. There, an increase in the number of ﬁrms
nduces ﬁrms to rely more on frame complexity and may harm consumers. 
Gu and Wenzel (2014) propose a sequential model where a prominent seller and its
ival compete in prices after committing to price complexity levels. They show that in
quilibrium ﬁrms randomize in prices, but choose deterministic complexity levels. The
alient ﬁrm chooses the highest complexity for sure, while the rival’s choice depends on
he market conditions. Consumer protection policies which reduce the share of confused
onsumers may backﬁre by making the less prominent ﬁrm increase its complexity. In
ontrast to our cut-oﬀ equilibrium model, in theirs, consumer surplus monotonically
ecreases in the level of prominence. 
As they model complexity as a long-run decision, Gu and Wenzel’s insights are relevant
n markets where obfuscation relates to product design rather than price disclosure. 10
n our framework where both prices and complexity levels can be changed frequently,
he prominent ﬁrm always randomizes on prices and price complexity levels, whereas for
elatively high salience levels, the rival chooses the lowest complexity for sure. Moreover,
 reduction in the share of confused always improves consumer surplus. 
In a sequential search model where all consumers sample ﬁrst one prominent ﬁrm,
rmstrong et al. (2009) demonstrate that, with homogeneous products, the salient seller
ets a lower price than its rivals, industry proﬁts are higher, and consumer surplus and
elfare lower than in a market where ﬁrms are equally prominent. They also show that
rominence beneﬁts both sellers and consumers when products are vertically diﬀeren-
iated (as the highest-quality producer has the strongest incentive to become salient).
rmstrong and Zhou (2011) explore ways in which a ﬁrm can become prominent:10 See also Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) , Wilson (2010) , and Taylor (2017) for search-cost models of obfus- 
ation. 
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 intermediaries may steer consumers to one ﬁrm for a fee, price advertisements may 
aﬀect the order in which ﬁrms’ oﬀers are sampled, or consumers’ default biases may 
be a source of prominence. See also Rhodes (2011) for a related model and Armstrong
(2017) for a recent review of the ordered search literature. 
In our clearinghouse setting, the order of search is irrelevant but prominence aﬀects the
behavior of consumers who are confused by price complexity. We focus on environments 
where ﬁrms commonly employ complex prices, for example, consumer banking and energy 
retail markets. Prominence might be driven by default biases favouring the product under 
consideration or related ones or it may be due to persuasive advertising or marketing 
ploys which make a ﬁrm’s product salient in a consumer’s mind and so more likely to be
considered. 
By considering the interplay between complexity and prominence in a model with 
consumer confusion, this study contributes to an emerging literature that explores the 
interaction between boundedly rational consumers and strategic ﬁrms. See Ellison (2006) , 
Spiegler (2011) , Huck and Zhou (2011) , Grubb (2015) , and Spiegler (2016) for related
discussions and surveys of recent work. Our model is also related to the literature on price
dispersion (see Baye et al., 2006 , for a review) and explores an asymmetric market where
ﬁrms simultaneously choose prices and complexity, and randomize in both dimensions. 
2. Model 
Consider a market for a homogeneous product with two sellers, ﬁrms 1 and 2. The ﬁrms
face zero marginal costs of production. There is a unit mass of consumers, each demanding
at most one unit of the product and willing to pay up to v = 1 . The ﬁrms compete by
simultaneously and independently choosing prices ( p 1 and p 2 ) and price complexity levels
( k 1 and k 2 ). The timing reﬂects the fact that in many cases both complexity and prices
can be changed relatively easily. The level of complexity k i captures how diﬃcult it is
for consumers to assess the price of ﬁrm i . The ﬁrms set prices p i ∈ [0 , 1] and can choose
any complexity level k i ∈ [ k , ¯k ] ⊂ R + free of cost. 
Depending on ﬁrms’ complexity choices, some consumers may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to assess 
the price oﬀers. For given k 1 and k 2 , a fraction μ( k 1 , k 2 ) ≤ 1 of the consumers are able
to accurately compare the price oﬀers and select the best deal (we refer to these as
the ‘experts’ or ‘informed’), but the remaining 1 − μ( k 1 , k 2 ) consumers are confused and
make random choices, which may be biased due to ﬁrm prominence. Let μ( k 1 , k 2 ) ∈ C 2 . 
If one ﬁrm unilaterally increases the complexity of its price, this lowers the fraction 
of expert consumers in the market ( ∂ μ/ ∂ k i < 0, for i = 1 , 2 ), but does not aﬀect the
marginal impact of the rival’s price complexity on consumers ( ∂ 2 μ/∂ k 1 ∂ k 2 = 0 ). For
simplicity, we assume that μ( k 1 , k 2 ) = 1 iﬀ k 1 = k 2 = k . That is, if both ﬁrms choose the
lowest complexity level k , all consumers are experts and buy the cheap er pro duct. 11 In11 This is without loss of generality so long as the monotonicity assumptions in the text are satisﬁed. 
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1ection 5 , we explore the robustness of our results for alternative confusion technologies
ith ∂ 2 μ/ ∂ k 1 ∂ k 2 > 0. 
We focus on the interaction between price complexity and ﬁrm prominence. In our
odel, prominence is exogenous (it may be due, for instance, to higher ﬁrm recognition
r perceived trustworthiness) and has an impact on product choice when consumers are
onfused by price complexity. It also aﬀects the choice of informed consumers if the two
rms oﬀer the same price. Without loss of generality, ﬁrm 1 is a ‘prominent’ seller so that
he consumers who are unable to assess the prices due to complexity are more likely to
urchase its product. That is, a fraction σ ∈ (1/2, 1) of the confused consumers buy from
rm 1 and the remaining 1 − σ buy from ﬁrm 2. Similarly, if both ﬁrms oﬀer the same
rice, a fraction σ ∈ (1/2, 1) of the experts buy from ﬁrm 1 and the remaining 1 − σ buy
rom ﬁrm 2. As a result, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are 
πi ( p i , p j , k i , k j ) = p i · [q i ( p i , p j ) μ( k i , k j ) + s i (1 − μ( k i , k j ))] 
here q i ( p i , p j ) is given by 
q i ( p i , p j ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
1 , if p i < min { p j , 1 } 
s i , if p i = p j ≤ 1 
0 , if p i > min { p j , 1 } 
for i, j ∈ { 1 , 2 } and i  = j 
ith s 1 = σ > 1 / 2 and s 2 = 1 − σ. 
In line with closely related work, we assume that the confused consumers do not
ay more than their reservation price ( v = 1 ). This may be because they have a budget
onstraint and realize at checkout (or after purchase) if the price is higher than v and
an decline to buy or return the product. Knowing this, ﬁrms do not have incentives
o set prices above consumers’ valuation. 12 Consumers’ behavior is aﬀected by market-
ide complexity and prominence, but independent of how the ﬁrms’ prices rank. This
aptures the idea that confusion due to complexity reduces consumers’ price sensitivity
nd weakens price competition. 
. Preliminary analysis 
We start by analyzing ﬁrms’ price and complexity choices when market-wide complex-
ty leads to consumer confusion and one ﬁrm is prominent. All proofs missing from the
ext are relegated to the appendix, unless speciﬁed otherwise. The following two results
ule out the existence of pure strategy equilibria. 
emma 1. There is no equilibrium where both ﬁrms choose pure price-complexity strate-
ies. 12 However, it can be shown that our results are qualitatively robust when confused consumers pay up to 
 + ε for ε < μ( k , ¯k ) . 
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 Pro of. Supp ose ﬁrm i ( j  = i ) chooses a deterministic complexity level k i ( k j ). 
(i) If k i = k j = k , all consumers are experts ( μ( k , k ) = 1 ) and the ﬁrms make zero
proﬁts by competing à la Bertrand. But then ﬁrm i could proﬁtably deviate to 
k d i = k ′ > k and a price p i = 1 which would result in a non-trivial mass of confused
consumers (i.e., 1 − μ( k ′ , k ) > 0 ) and strictly positive proﬁts. Hence, it must be
that in any candidate equilibrium at least one ﬁrm (w.l.o.g. let it be i ) chooses
k i > k . 
(ii) By (i) for any candidate equilibrium proﬁle of price complexities ( k i , k j ), some
consumers are confused, i.e., 1 − μ( k i , k j ) > 0. But then for any such proﬁle
( k i , k j ), there is a unique pricing equilibrium where ﬁrms randomize according to a
c.d.f. on [ p 0 , 1], with p 0 = σ(1 − μ( k i , k j )) / [1 − (1 − σ)(1 − μ( k i , k j ))] > 0 (see, for
instance, Baye et al., 1992 ), and ﬁrm i makes proﬁt πi = p 0 [1 − s j (1 − μ( k i , k j ))] .
But, as it must be that k i > k , ﬁrm i could proﬁtably deviate to p d i = p 0 and k d i = k 
which would result in proﬁt πd i = p 0 [1 − s j (1 − μ( k , k j ))] > p 0 [1 − s j (1 − μ( k i , k j ))]
as μ( k , k j )) > μ( k i , k j ). So, there can be no equilibrium where both ﬁrms choose pure
price complexity strategies. 
This analysis focuses on σ ∈ (1/2, 1), but the result in Lemma 1 carries over when
σ = 1 / 2 . When σ = 1 , there is an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium where ﬁrm 1
chooses k¯ and ﬁrm 2 chooses k . In that case, while there are both expert and confused
consumers, but ﬁrm 2 does not serve latter and the deviation in part (ii) of the proof of
Lemma 1 does not hold as s j = 0 when i = 1 . 
Lemma 1 implies that in any candidate equilibrium at least one ﬁrm randomizes on
complexity levels. As a result, both ﬁrms face two types of consumers, confused and
experts. 13 There is a conﬂict between the incentive to extract all surplus from confused
consumers and the incentive to reduce price and compete for experts. This intuition 
underlies the following result, whose proof is standard and therefore omitted; see Varian 
(1980) and Rosenthal (1980) . 
Lemma 2. There is no equilibrium where both ﬁrms use pure pricing strategies. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that in any duopoly equilibrium there must be dispersion
in both prices and complexity levels. Firm i ’s strategy space is [0 , 1] × [ k , ¯k ] . Denote by
ξi ≡ ξi ( p i , k i ) ﬁrm i ’s mixed strategy for i = 1 , 2 . ξi is a bivariate c.d.f. and can be written
as ξi = F i ( p i ) H i ( k i | p i ) , where F i ( p i ) is the marginal c.d.f. of ﬁrm i ’s random price and
H i ( k i | p i ) is the conditional c.d.f. of ﬁrm i ’s complexity level. (If the two random variables,
p i and k i are independent, H i ( k i | p i ) = H i ( k i ) .) For F i ( p ) and H i ( k i | p i ) to be well-deﬁned13 We focus on a case where μ( k , k ) = 1 . However, Lemma 1 is robust for μ( k , k ) < 1 so long as ∂ μ/ ∂ k i < 0, 
for i = 1 , 2 . In that case, even for k i = k j = k , ﬁrms face both experts and confused and so in the candidate 
price equilibrium, π1 = p 0 [1 − (1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , k ))] = σ(1 − μ( k , k )) . But, ﬁrm 1 can proﬁtably deviate to 
p d i = 1 and k 
d 
1 = ¯k as π
d 
1 = σ(1 − μ( ¯k , k )) > σ(1 − μ( k , k )) . As at least one of the ﬁrms chooses k i > k , part 
(ii) in the proof of Lemma 1 applies. 
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b.d.f.s they should be increasing on their supports. Using the approach in Narasimhan
1988) and Baye et al. (1992) , we show that both ﬁrms choose prices according to c.d.f.s
hich are deﬁned on a common interval T = [p 0 , 1] and are continuous everywhere except
ossibly at the upper bound p = 1 ; see Appendix A.1 . 
Suppose ﬁrm i  = j chooses a price p i and complexity level k i . Firm i ’s expected proﬁt,
hich depends on ﬁrm i ’s choices and on the rival’s mixed strategy ξj , can be written
s 
πi ( p i , k i , ξj ) = p i 
[ ∫ 1 
p i 
( ∫ k¯ 
k 
μ( k i , k j ( p j )) dH j ( k j | p j ) 
) 
dF j ( p j ) 
] 
+ p i s i 
[ 
1 −
∫ 1 
p 0 
( ∫ k¯ 
k 
μ( k i , k j ( p j )) dH j ( k j | p j ) 
) 
dF j ( p j ) 
] 
. 
he expected base of confused consumers is the term in the second square brackets in
i ( p i , k i , ξj ). The remaining consumers form the expected base of experts. But, the
xperts purchase from ﬁrm i only when it oﬀers a lower price than its rival. The expected
umber of experts, conditional on ﬁrm i being the low price seller, is the term in the ﬁrst
quare brackets. Firm i serves a share s i of the expected base of confused consumers.
sing Leibniz’s Rule, the ﬁrst derivative of πi ( p i , k i , ξj ) w.r.t. k i is given by 
p i 
∫ 1 
p i 
( ∫ k¯ 
k 
∂μ
∂k i 
dH j ( k j | p j ) 
) 
dF j ( p j ) − p i s i 
∫ 1 
p 0 
( ∫ k¯ 
k 
∂μ
∂k i 
dH j ( k j | p j ) 
) 
dF j ( p j ) . 
ut ∂ 2 μ/∂ k i ∂ k j = 0 , so ∂ μ( k i , k j )/ ∂k i is independent of k j , and the ﬁrst derivative be-
omes 
p i 
∂μ
∂k i 
[ (1 − F j ( p i )) − s i ] . 
Then, as ∂μ( k i , k j )/ ∂k i < 0, to maximize its expected-proﬁt ﬁrm i chooses 
k i ( p i ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
k if 1 − F j ( p i ) > s i ⇔ p i < ̂ pi 
k¯ if 1 − F j ( p i ) < s i ⇔ p i > ̂ pi 
k, ∀ k ∈ [ k , ¯k ] if p i = ̂ pi , 
here the threshold price ̂ pi is implicitly deﬁned by F j ( ̂  pi ) = 1 − s i , whenever ̂ pi belongs
o the support of F j . Lemma 1 implies that at least one of the cut-oﬀ prices ̂ pi belongs
o T , as at least one ﬁrm mixes on complexity levels. The next result follows. 
roposition 1. In equilibrium, a ﬁrm’s complexity choice depends only on its price. Firm
 chooses its price according to a c.d.f. F i ( p i ) with support T = [p 0 , 1] . If p i < ̂ pi ( p i >̂ i ) ﬁrm i chooses the lowest complexity k (highest complexity k¯ ). If p i = ̂ pi , ﬁrm i is
ndiﬀerent between any complexity level k ∈ [ k , ¯k ] . If the cut-oﬀ price ̂ pi ∈ T, then it is
mplicitly deﬁned by F j ( ̂  pi ) = s j . If ̂ pi / ∈ T, ﬁrm i chooses a deterministic complexity level,
ut then it must be that ﬁrm j randomizes on complexity levels, i.e. ̂ pj ∈ ( p 0 , 1) . 
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 When a ﬁrm mixes on complexity in equilibrium, there is a positive relationship be-
tween prices and complexity levels. If ̂ pi ∈ T , at all prices below the cut-oﬀ level ̂ pi ,
ﬁrm i chooses the lowest complexity and at all prices above ̂ pi , it chooses the highest
complexity level. Intuitively, when a ﬁrm chooses a relatively high price, its incentive to
choose high complexity is stronger as it relies more on selling to confused consumers. In
contrast, when setting a relatively low price, a ﬁrm has a stronger incentive to choose
low complexity as this results in a larger base of experts. 
We ﬁrst analyze a situation where both ﬁrms randomize on complexity levels, and so
the cut-oﬀ prices deﬁned in Proposition 1 must satisfy ̂ pi ∈ T = ( p 0 , 1 ) for i = 1 , 2 . This
implies that ﬁrm i chooses complexity level k with probability F i ( ̂  pi ) and complexity 
level k¯ with probability 1 − F i ( ̂  pi ) . The threshold prices ̂ pi ∈ T are implicitly deﬁned
by F j ( ̂  pi ) = s j for j = 1 , 2 , j  = i , where s j is ﬁrm j ’s share of consumers confused by
complexity (i.e., s 1 = σ > 1 / 2 and s 2 = 1 − σ). For expositional simplicity, denote: 
λ1 ≡ F 1 ( ̂  p1 ) and λ2 ≡ F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) . 
Consistency requires that F i ( ̂  pi ) ∈ (0 , 1) and F i ( ̂  pj ) = s i . The following condition holds
when both ﬁrms mix on both prices and complexity levels in equilibrium (see Appendix
A.6 ). 
Condition 1. 
0 < p 0 < ̂ p1 < ̂ p2 < 1 . 
Below we illustrate the derivation of ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt. Consider a price 
p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p1 ) . By Proposition 1 , ﬁrm 1 associates prices in this range with complexity
level k . Then, its expected proﬁt is 
π1 ( p, k ) = p 
[
( F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) − F 2 ( p )) + (1 − F 2 ( ̂  p2 )) μ( k , ¯k ) + σ(1 − F 2 ( ̂  p2 ))(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
. (1) 
With probability F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) , ﬁrm 2 chooses k , so that all consumers are experts, i.e., μ( k , k ) =
1 . The experts purchase from ﬁrm 1 if ﬁrm 2’s price is higher, which happens with
probability F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) − F 2 ( p ) . With probability 1 − F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) , ﬁrm 2 chooses k¯ and there are
μ( k , ¯k ) informed and 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) confused consumers. All the informed purchase from
ﬁrm 1 as it oﬀers a lower price (ﬁrm 2 associates k¯ with prices higher than ̂ p2 ) and so
does a share σ of the confused consumers. The ﬁrst two terms in square brackets capture
the expected number of experts, while the last term in square brackets gives the expected
number of confused consumers. 
Consider ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt for a price p ∈ [ ̂  p1 , ̂  p2 ] . By Proposition 1 , ﬁrm 1
associates prices in this range with complexity level k¯ . Then, its expected proﬁt is 
π1 ( p, ¯k ) = p 
{
( F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) − F 2 ( p )) μ( k , ¯k ) + (1 − F 2 ( ̂  p2 )) μ( ¯k , ¯k ) + σ
[
F 2 ( ̂  p2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
+ (1 − F 2 ( ̂  p2 ))(1 − μ( ¯k , ¯k )) 
]}
. 
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che expected number of confused consumers is the term in square brackets. Firm 1
erves a fraction σ of this group. Firm 1 also serves the expert consumers if ﬁrm 2
hooses a higher price. With probability F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) − F 2 ( p ) , there are μ( k , ¯k ) experts while,
ith probability 1 − F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) , there are μ( ¯k , ¯k ) ; this is reﬂected by the ﬁrst two terms in
urly brackets. 
Consider ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt for p ∈ ( ̂  p2 , 1] . By Proposition 1 , ﬁrm 1 associates
rices in this range with complexity level k¯ . Then, its expected proﬁt is 
π1 ( p, ¯k ) = p 
{
(1 − F 2 ( p )) μ( ¯k , ¯k ) + σ
[
F 2 ( ̂  p2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + (1 − F 2 ( ̂  p2 ))(1 − μ( ¯k , ¯k )) 
]}
. 
choing previous reasoning, with probability F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) ﬁrm 2 chooses k , in which case there
re μ( k , ¯k ) informed and 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) confused consumers. A share σ of the confused
onsumers purchases from ﬁrm 1, the prominent seller. The experts do not purchase
rom ﬁrm 1 as ﬁrm 2’s price is lower. With probability 1 − F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) , ﬁrm 2 chooses k¯ ,
o there are μ( ¯k , ¯k ) experts and 1 − μ( ¯k , ¯k ) confused consumers. A share σ of confused
onsumers buy from ﬁrm 1. The experts purchase from ﬁrm 1 if it oﬀers a lower price,
hich happens with probability 1 − F 2 ( p ) . The ﬁrst term in curly brackets captures the
xpected number of experts, while the term in square brackets gives the expected number
f confused consumers. 
In Appendix A.2 , we present ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁts at p 0 , ˆ p1 and ˆ p2 and also when
 → ̂ p1 and p → ̂ p2 . There, we also derive ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁt over the three price
anges, using the same approach as above. Next section combines these derivations to
haracterize the mixed strategy equilibrium and to identify a condition on the param-
ter values under which both ﬁrms randomize on both prices and complexity levels in
quilibrium. When this condition does not hold – which happens when ﬁrm 1’s level of
rominence is relatively high – both ﬁrms mix on prices, but only the prominent ﬁrm
andomizes on complexity levels. 
. Equilibrium analysis 
In equilibrium, ﬁrm i ’s expected proﬁt for any price-complexity combination ( p , k i ),
hich is assigned positive density in equilibrium, must be constant. Then, using expres-
ions (A.1) –(A.3), (A.6) , and (A.7) from Appendix A.2 , we can write the price ratios
 0 / ̂ p1 and p 0 / ̂ p2 as functions of λ2 = F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) and λ1 = F 1 ( ̂  p1 ) , ﬁrm 2’s and ﬁrm 1’s
robabilities of choosing k in equilibrium, respectively. These ratios are presented in
ppendix A.3 . We then obtain the equilibrium values of λ1 and λ2 , 
λ1 = 
(1 − σ)[1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) and λ2 = 
σ[1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . (2)
t can be checked that λ1 ∈ (0, 1) and λ2 > 0. Furthermore, λ2 < 1 holds iﬀ the following
ondition is satisﬁed. 
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 Condition 2. 
( 1 − σ) / [σ(1 − σ + σ2 )] > 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) . 
As μ( ¯k , ¯k ) = 2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1 and 0 ≤ μ( ¯k , ¯k ) < μ( k , ¯k ) , it follows that 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) ≤ 1 / 2 .
For relatively low levels of prominence (that is, for σ < 0.71), this condition always holds
and so ﬁrm 2 mixes between the highest and the lowest price complexity levels. More
generally, for a given μ( k , ¯k ) , the condition is satisﬁed when ﬁrm 1’s level of prominence is
not too high. However, Condition 2 gets more stringent as ﬁrm 1’s prominence increases
(the LHS of the inequality in the condition is decreasing in σ). When ﬁrm 1 is prominent
enough, ﬁrm 2 beneﬁts more from price transparency, as its share of confused consumers
is relatively small. 
In Appendix A.3 , we show that when λi ∈ (0, 1), the consistency requirements also
hold: F i ( ̂  p1 ) < F i ( ̂  p2 ) for i = 1 , 2 , where F i ( ̂  pi ) = λi and F i ( ̂  pj ) = s i . Also there, we ex-
plore the ﬁrms’ price c.d.f.s at the upper bound of the support. Using Lemma 4 , we
show that ﬁrm 2’s price c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while ﬁrm 1 has a mass point at
the upp er b ound of the price c.d.f.’s support, p = 1 . Then, we verify that p 0 , ̂ p1 , and ̂ p2 
are well deﬁned under Condition 2 . Finally, we present the equilibrium cut-oﬀ prices in
expressions (A.8) and (A.9) , followed by the pricing c.d.f.s of the two ﬁrms. Using (A.1),
(A.4) and (2) , we obtain the equilibrium proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 ( π∗1 ) and the lower bound of the 
price support ( p 0 ). 
π∗1 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
2 − σ − σ(σ2 − 2 σ + 3 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ; (3) 
p 0 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
2 − σ − σ(σ2 − 2 σ + 3 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
μ( k , ¯k ) + σ(1 − σ)( σ2 − σ + 1)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 2 . (4) 
Using (4) and (A.6) , we calculate ﬁrm 2’s equilibrium proﬁt, 
π∗2 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))) 
2 − σ − σ(σ2 − 2 σ + 3 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . (5) 
Note that π∗1 /π∗2 = λ2 /σ = (1 − σ) /λ1 . 
Below we summarize our ﬁndings. 
Proposition 2. Under Condition 2 , in the unique mixed strategy equilibrium ﬁrm i chooses
the lowest complexity k with probability λi = F i ( ̂  pi ) ∈ (0 , 1) , deﬁned in ( 2 ) and highest
complexity k¯ with probability 1 − λi . Both ﬁrms randomize on prices in [ p 0 , 1], with p 0 
given in ( 4 ). Firm 2’s price c.d.f. (F 2 ) is continuous everywhere, while ﬁrm 1’s price
c.d.f. (F 1 ) is continuous on [ p 0 , 1) and has an atom at p = 1 . Firm i uses k ( ¯k ) at prices
below (above) ̂ pi ∈ ( p 0 , 1) . The equilibrium proﬁts π∗1 and π∗2 are given in (3) and (5) . 
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Fig. 1. The ﬁrms’ price c.d.f.s for σ = . 6 and μ( k , ¯k ) = . 6 . F 1 ( p ) is the bottom line and F 2 ( p ) is the top line. 
The dashed lines correspond to prices associated with k . 
 
C  
l  
t  
c  
r  
i
E  
p  
a
w  
π
 
d  
t  When ﬁrm 1’s prominence is not too high in the sense that σ > 1/2, but
ondition 2 is satisﬁed, both ﬁrms randomize on complexity levels and prices in equi-
ibrium. In this case, the diﬀerence in the ﬁrms’ shares of confused consumers is not
oo large. In the limit, when σ → 1/2, λ1 = λ2 = 1 / 2 , ̂ p1 = ̂ p2 , and both ﬁrms’ pricing
.d.f.s are continuous everywhere on their common support. This is consistent with the
esults in Carlin (2009) . The following numerical example and Fig. 1 illustrate the result
n Proposition 2 . 
xample 1. When σ = . 6 and μ( k , ¯k ) = . 6 , in equilibrium ﬁrm 1 and 2 choose k with
robabilities λ1 = . 357 and λ2 = . 672 , respectively. The two ﬁrms randomize on prices
ccording to the following c.d.f.s, which are illustrated in Fig. 1 , 
F 1 ( p ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
. 846 − . 284 /p f or p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p2 ) 
1 . 171 − . 474 /p f or p ∈ [ ̂  p2 , ̂  p1 ] 
2 . 131 − 1 . 422 /p f or p ∈ ( ̂  p1 , 1] 
and 
F 2 ( p ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
. 948 − . 319 /p f or p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p2 ) 
1 . 313 − . 531 /p f or p ∈ [ ̂  p2 , ̂  p1 ] 
2 . 593 − 1 . 593 /p f or p ∈ ( ̂  p1 , 1) 
, 
here p 0 = . 336 , ̂ p1 = . 582 , and ̂ p2 = . 829 . Firm 1 and ﬁrm 2 make proﬁts π∗1 = . 319 and
∗
2 = . 284 , respectively. Firm 1’s atom at p = 1 is φ = . 108 . 
When Condition 2 does not hold, the results in Proposition 2 no longer apply as the
erived λ2 is weakly larger than 1 (and to be a well-deﬁned probability and for both ﬁrms
o randomize on complexity, λ2 should be strictly smaller than 1). In this case, because
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 ﬁrm 1’s prominence advantage is large enough, ﬁrm 2 serves a relatively small share
of confused consumers. Then, ﬁrm 2 relies more on expert consumers and so beneﬁts
more from market transparency than from confusion. We prove the following result in 
Appendix A.4 . 
Proposition 3. When Condition 2 does not hold, in the unique mixed strategy equilibrium 
ﬁrm 2 chooses k for sure and ﬁrm 1 chooses the lowest complexity k with probability 
λh 1 = F h 1 ( ̂  ph 1 ) and the highest complexity k¯ with probability 1 − λh 1 , where 
λh 1 = 
( 1 − σ) [1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
Both ﬁrms randomize on prices in [p h 0 , 1] , with p h 0 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . Firm 2’s price c.d.f.
F h 2 is continuous everywhere, while ﬁrm 1’s price c.d.f. F h 1 is continuous on [p h 0 , 1) and has
an atom at p = 1 . Firm 1 uses k ( ¯k ) at prices below (above) ̂ ph 1 = (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ∈ ( p h 0 , 1) .
The equilibrium proﬁts are given by 
π∗h 1 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) and π∗h 2 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . (6) 
When prominence is large enough, ﬁrm 2 chooses the lowest complexity for sure to
minimize the number of confused buyers and reduce its disadvantage. The prominent 
ﬁrm, as b efore, asso ciates lower prices with the lowest complexity (at those prices it
beneﬁts from more transparency) and higher prices with highest complexity (at those 
prices it relies more on confused consumers). Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm 1 chooses complexity k 
for all prices p < ̂ ph 1 ∈ ( p h 0 , 1) and k¯ for all prices p ≥ ̂ ph 1 . Proposition 1 then requires
that ﬁrms’ pricing c.d.f.s satisfy F h 2 ( ̂  ph 1 ) = 1 − σ and F h 1 (1) ≤ σ (that is, ̂ ph 2 ≥ 1 ). 14 The
following example and Fig. 2 illustrate the results for relatively high prominence. 
Example 2. When σ = . 8 and μ( k , ¯k ) = . 6 , in equilibrium ﬁrm 1 chooses k with prob-
ability λh 1 = . 145 , while ﬁrm 2 chooses k for sure. The two ﬁrms randomize on prices
according to the following c.d.f.s, which are illustrated in Fig. 2 , 
F h 1 ( p ) = 
{ 
. 726 − . 232 /p f or p ∈ [p h 0 , ̂  ph 1 ) 
1 . 113 − . 387 /p f or p ∈ [ ̂  ph 1 , 1] 
and 
F h 2 ( p ) = 
{ 
1 − . 32 /p f or p ∈ [p h 0 , ̂  ph 1 ) 
1 . 533 − . 533 /p f or p ∈ [ ̂  ph 1 , 1) 
, 
where p h 0 = . 32 and ̂ ph 1 = . 4 . Firm 1 and ﬁrm 2 make proﬁts π∗h 1 = . 32 and π∗h 2 = . 232 ,
respectively. Firm 1’s atom at p = 1 is φh = . 274 . 14 As by Lemma 1 F h 1 ( ̂  p
h 
2 ) = σ, if F 
h 
1 (1) > σ then ̂ ph 2 < 1 and the candidate λh 2 = F 2 ( ̂  ph 2 ) < 1. But this is 
inconsistent with an equilibrium where ﬁrm 2 chooses k for sure. 
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i  The remainder of this section uses Propositions 2 and 3 to explore the role of promi-
ence on market outcomes. 
In Examples 1 and 2 where μ( k , ¯k ) = 0 . 6 , an increase in σ from.6 to.8 results in a de-
rease in industry proﬁt from.603 to.552. This shows that an increase in the prominence
evel might harm industry proﬁt, in which case it beneﬁts the consumers, as total surplus
s normalized to one. It also indicates that markets where an entrant competes with a
rominent enough incumbent may b e more comp etitive than markets where the diﬀer-
nces in prominence between suppliers are relatively smaller, which may be of relevance
n retail electricity markets where new entrants facing incumbent suppliers could become
ore prominent over time. Holding μ( k , ¯k ) = 0 . 6 , Fig. 3 illustrates individual and aggre-
ate proﬁts as functions of the level of prominence. In this case, total industry proﬁt is
owest and consumers surplus highest at σ = 0 . 754 , which is the cut-oﬀ prominence level
or the two types of equilibria presented in Propositions 2 and 3 . 
xample 3. Suppose μ( k , ¯k ) = 0 . 6 . Then, Condition 2 holds iﬀ σ < 0.754. 
In our framework, an increase in the level of prominence aﬀects pricing, and ultimately
roﬁts, in two ways. First, prominence has a direct eﬀect on prices as it reallocates the
onfused consumers in favour of the salient ﬁrm. Second, prominence aﬀects the ﬁrms’
robabilities of choosing the lowest price complexity, i.e., λ1 and λ2 – which endogenize
he expected share of confused consumers – and, therefore, it also has an indirect eﬀect
n prices through this channel. 
In settings where the total share of confused consumers is exogenous, only the di-
ect eﬀect plays a role. In that case, an increase in the level of prominence b o osts
ndustry proﬁt and so harms consumer welfare; this can be easily checked, for instance,
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Fig. 3. The proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 (medium solid) and ﬁrm 2 (dashed), and total proﬁt (thick solid) for μ( k , ¯k ) = . 6 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 in Narasimhan (1988) . Gu and Wenzel (2014) show that this result is qualitatively ro-
bust in a sequential set-up where a salient ﬁrm and its rival ﬁrst commit to complexity
levels and then compete in prices. In their analysis, although the share of confused is
determined endogenously, ﬁrms choose deterministic complexity levels and the pricing 
stage is similar to Narasimhan (1988) . 
The comparative statics of consumers surplus with respect to the prominence level 
in our model is diﬀerent from the corresponding result in the sequential move setting 
of Gu and Wenzel (2014) . However, our non-monotonicity result is not due to the tim-
ing of the game per se but to the cut-oﬀ structure of the equilibrium – that is, to the
statistical dep endence b etween ﬁrms’ pricing and price complexity equilibrium strate- 
gies. 15 Therefore, the indirect eﬀect on ﬁrms’ probabilities of choosing the lowest price 
complexity identiﬁes a novel channel through which prominence aﬀects industry proﬁt 
and consumer surplus. This novel eﬀect is related to the conﬂicting incentives of the two
ﬁrms identiﬁed in our next result. 
Corollary 1. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, ﬁrm 2’s probability of using the lowest
complexity ( λ2 ) weakly increases in the level of prominence ( σ), while ﬁrm 1’s corre-
sponding probability ( λ1 ) decreases in σ. 
An increase in the prominence level increases the salient ﬁrm’s share of confused 
consumers and so it lowers its incentive to choose the lowest price complexity level ( k ).
The larger is ﬁrm 1’s share of confused consumers, the more the ﬁrm beneﬁts from15 For instance, in a simultaneous move setting where price format diﬀerentiation is the main source of 
confusion (rather than complexity), price and price format decisions are independent in equilibrium and 
consumer surplus decreases in the degree of asymmetry/prominence; see Chioveanu (2019) . 
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i  onfusion. In contrast, an increase in prominence decreases the less salient ﬁrm’s share of
onfused consumers and so it b o osts this ﬁrm’s incentive to choose k . The lower is ﬁrm
’s share of confused consumers, the more it beneﬁts from transparency. 
For relatively high levels of prominence – i.e., when Condition 2 does not hold – ﬁrm
 chooses k for sure (i.e. λ2 = 1 ) and, unlike its rival, it cannot directly aﬀect market
ransparency by adjusting its probability of choosing k in response to an increase in σ.
n this range, industry proﬁt strictly increases and consumer surplus strictly decreases
n σ (see Appendix A.5 for the details). 
For relatively low levels of prominence – i.e., when Condition 2 holds – both ﬁrms
an adjust their probabilities of choosing k in response to an increase in σ and they have
onﬂicting incentives. In this range, industry proﬁt may decrease and consumer surplus
ay increase in σ. Numerical examples suggest that this is the case in the range of σ’s
here λ2 < 1 is close to 1 and where an increase in prominence makes the less prominent
rm a more aggressive competitor. 
In our simultaneous move setting, the direct and indirect eﬀects of prominence on
ricing cannot be clearly separated and general comparative statics analysis is intractable.
owever, a combination of numerical simulations and analytical results provide further
nsights. Over the range of σ’s where Condition 2 holds, industry proﬁt has an inverted-
 shape. Outside this range, it is strictly increasing. As a result, consumer surplus is
aximized either at the cut-oﬀ prominence level for the two types of equilibria presented
n Propositions 2 and 3 (this happens for μ( k , ¯k )  0 . 8 , see Example 3 for an illustration)
r as σ → 0.5 (which happens for μ( k , ¯k )  0 . 8 ). The cut-oﬀ prices of ﬁrms 1 and 2,
re weakly decreasing and, respectively, increasing in σ: ̂ p1 ( ̂  p2 ) is strictly decreasing
increasing) in σ, while ̂ ph 1 = 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) ( ̂  ph 2 = 1 ) are constant and so independent of σ.
he lower bound of the ﬁrms’ price support ( p 0 ) has an inverted-U shape over the range of
’s where Condition 2 holds and it is strictly increasing outside this range ( p h 0 = σ̂ ph 1 ).
he likeliho o d that the prominent ﬁrm chooses the monopoly price strictly increases
n σ. 
orollary 2. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, (i) the more prominent ﬁrm makes higher
roﬁts than the rival; (ii) the price distribution of the prominent ﬁrm ﬁrst order stochas-
ically dominates the one of the less prominent ﬁrm; (iii) the more prominent ﬁrm’s
verage price is higher than that of the less prominent ﬁrm, and (iv) the less prominent
rm chooses the lowest complexity ( k ) with higher probability than the rival. 
The prominent ﬁrm attracts a larger share of confused consumers, and so it beneﬁts
ore from market-wide confusion. For this reason, it chooses the highest level of com-
lexity with higher probability than its rival, has lower incentives to compete for the
xpert consumers, and therefore it chooses a higher average price. The combined eﬀect
f charging higher prices (in the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance sense) and attracting a
igher share of the confused consumers allows the prominent ﬁrm to make higher proﬁts
n equilibrium. Confused consumers’ bias in favor of the prominent ﬁrm appears to be in-
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 consistent with the ranking of the average prices. Our next result focuses on the ranking
of the average prices, conditional on these b eing asso ciated with the lowest complexity
( k ). 
Corollary 3. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the more prominent ﬁrm chooses a lower
cut-oﬀ price – below which it uses the lowest level of price complexity k – than its rival
( ̂  p1 < ̂ p2 when Condition 2 holds and ̂ ph 1 < ̂ ph 2 = 1 when it does not). Furthermore,
conditional on choosing the lowest complexity, the more prominent ﬁrm oﬀers a lower 
average price than its rival: E( p 1 | p 1 < ̂ p1 ) < E( p 2 | p 2 < ̂ p2 ) when Condition 2 holds,
and E( p 1 | p 1 < ̂ ph 1 ) < E( p 2 | p 2 < ̂ ph 2 ) when it does not. 
We prove this corollary in Appendix A.5 and sketch here the intuition. The price c.d.f.s
of the two ﬁrms, conditional on price being strictly less than p < 1, are identical. This
is because unconditional price densities are proportional everywhere below p = 1 , which
can be easily seen in Examples 1 and 2 . Combined with the fact that in equilibrium the
cut-oﬀ price below which ﬁrm 1 chooses k is lower than the cut-oﬀ price of ﬁrm 2 (that
is, ̂ p1 < ̂ p2 , if Condition 2 holds, and ̂ ph 1 < ̂ ph 2 , if it does not), this proves the corollary. 
Hence, in our model, consumers’ bias for the prominent ﬁrm is consistent with the
ranking of the average prices conditional on the lowest complexity. For example, if in-
formation on prices associated with the lowest complexity gets aggregated through in- 
teractions between confused consumers (e.g. on social media), then the raking of these 
conditional prices would conﬁrm the consumer bias for the prominent ﬁrm ex-post. 
Another interpretation, suggested by a referee, could make confused consumers’ bias 
consistent with market outcomes ex-p ost. Supp ose that confused consumers are more 
likely to buy from the ﬁrm with the largest market share. Then, in markets where the
share of experts is small enough, the prominent ﬁrm’s market share will be larger than
the rival’s and so confused consumers’ bias for this ﬁrm would be conﬁrmed by the market
shares. 
5. Alternative confusion technologies 
The main analysis assumes that a marginal increase in ﬁrm i ’s complexity reduces
the fraction of experts in the market but does not alter the eﬀectiveness of the rival’s
marginal increase in price complexity on consumers, that is, ∂ 2 μ/∂ k 1 ∂ k 2 = 0 . Below we
prove that there exists an equilibrium which is qualitatively consistent with the one in
the main analysis whenever ∂ 2 μ/ ∂ k 1 ∂ k 2 > 0. As ∂ μ/∂ k i = μi < 0, this condition requires
that the magnitude of the marginal impact of ﬁrm i ’s complexity be decreasing in ﬁrm
j ’s complexity ( ∂ | μi |/ ∂ k j < 0). 16 More speciﬁcally, we show that if the rival uses a mixed
strategy with a positive relationship between price and price complexity, it is a best16 An example of confusion technology which satisﬁes this assumption is μ( k 1 , k 2 ) = ( k ) 2 /( k 1 k 2 ). 
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ﬁ  esponse for a ﬁrm to associate prices below a threshold with the lowest complexity and
rices above it with the highest complexity. 
Suppose that ﬁrm j uses a mixed strategy ξj so that dk j ( p j )/ dp j ≥ 0. Consider the
xpected proﬁts of ﬁrm i presented in Section 3 : 
πi ( p i , k i , ξj ) = p i 
∫ 1 
p i 
( ∫ k¯ 
k 
μ( k i , k j ( p j )) dH j ( k j | p j ) 
) 
dF j ( p j ) 
+ p i s i 
[ 
1 −
∫ 1 
p 0 
( ∫ k¯ 
k 
μ( k i , k j ( p j )) dH j ( k j | p j ) 
) 
dF j ( p j ) 
] 
. 
The f.o.c. of ﬁrm i ’s expected proﬁt maximization w.r.t. k i requires that 
p i 
(∫ 1 
p i 
E ( μi ( p j ) | p j ) dF j ( p j ) − s i 
∫ 1 
p 0 
E ( μi ( p j )) dF j ( p j ) 
)
= 0 , (7)
here ∂μ( k i , k j ( p j ))/ ∂k i ≡ μi ( k i , k j ( p j )) gives the marginal impact of k i on μ and E ( μi ( p j ) |
 j ) = 
∫ k¯ 
k 
μi ( k i , k j ( p j )) dH j ( k j | p j ) is the expected marginal impact of an increase in k i
n the fraction of experts conditional on ﬁrm j ’s price. For given ξj , 
∫ 1 
p 0 
E ( μi ( p j )) dF j ( p j )
the overall expected marginal impact of an increase in k i on the fraction of experts –
s a constant. At p i = p 0 , the term in brackets becomes (1 − s i ) 
∫ 1 
p 0 
E ( μi ( p j )) dF j ( p j ) < 0
nd when p i → 1, it converges to −s i 
∫ 1 
p 0 
E ( μi ( p j )) dF j ( p j ) > 0 . So, there is at least one
rice ̂ pi ∈ ( p 0 , 1 ) which satisﬁes (7) . Moreover, ̂ pi is unique if 
d 
(∫ 1 
p i 
E ( μi ( p j ) | p j ) dF j ( p j ) 
)
/dp i = 
∫ 1 
p i 
[
d ( E ( μi ( p j ) | p j ) ) 
dp i 
]
dF j ( p j ) − μe i ( p i ) F ′ j ( p i ) > 0 , 
here the equality follows from Leibniz’s Rule. As −μe i ( p i ) > 0 and F ′ j ( p i ) > 0 , this
ondition holds if d E ( μi ( p j ) | p j ) /dp i > 0 . But, as dk j ( p j )/ dp j > 0, a suﬃcient condition
s then ∂μi ( k i , k j ) /∂k j = ∂ 2 μ( k i , k j )/ ∂k i ∂k j > 0. Hence, whenever ∂ 2 μ/ ∂k i ∂k j > 0 there
xists a unique ̂ pi ∈ ( p 0 , 1 ) which satisﬁes (7) and it follows that ﬁrm i ’s complexity level
hoice is 
k i ( p ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
k if p < ̂ pi 
k¯ if p > ̂ pi 
k, ∀ k ∈ [ k , ¯k ] if p = ̂ pi , 
henever ̂ pi belongs to T j the support of F j . Lemma 1 implies that at least one of the
ut-oﬀ prices ̂ pi belongs to T j . This shows that a mixed strategy equilibrium like the one
nalyzed in our benchmark model exists for a more general confusion technology. 
. Conclusions 
We analyze the interplay between consumer confusion due to price complexity and
rm prominence in a model where two ﬁrms compete by simultaneously choosing prices
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 and the complexity of their price oﬀers. One of the ﬁrms enjoys a higher level of promi-
nence, which may be due to higher brand recognition, industry dynamics, or advertising 
eﬀort/spending. Price complexity leads to consumer confusion so that some buyers are 
able to identify the best oﬀer, while others may get confused. The share of confused
consumers is determined by market-wide complexity. The confused consumers shop at 
random and favor the more prominent ﬁrm, in the sense that they are more likely to buy
from it. 
In equilibrium there is dispersion in both prices and complexity levels. The nature of
the equilibrium depends on the level of prominence. For moderate levels of prominence, 
both ﬁrms mix on price complexity levels, while for high levels of prominence, the less
prominent ﬁrm chooses the lowest price complexity for sure. The prominent ﬁrm makes 
higher proﬁts, chooses higher prices on average and the lowest complexity level with lower 
probability, and sets the monopoly price with positive probability. 
In our model, a decrease in prominence may increase industry proﬁts and harm con-
sumers. In addition, conditional on choosing the lowest complexity, the prominent ﬁrm 
sets a lower price, on average, which is consistent with confused consumers’ behavior. 
This suggests that it may be useful to investigate in the future an alternative model
where confused consumers’ beliefs about the price ranking is based on the average prices
conditional on lowest complexity and where, as a result, prominence is endogenous. Fi- 
nally, our analysis shows that a qualitatively similar equilibrium exists with alternative 
confusion technologies if the marginal impact of an increase in one ﬁrm’s complexity 
increases in the rival’s complexity level. 
Appendix A 
A.1. Properties of the pricing distribution functions 
The proofs of the lemmata below are standard and presented in the working paper
version ( Chioveanu, 2017 ). 
Lemma 3. The supports of the pricing c.d.f.s, T 1 and T 2 are both connected intervals
(i.e., there are no gaps in either of them). 
Lemma 4. Neither ﬁrm can have a mass point in the interior or at the lower bound of
the other ﬁrm’s price c.d.f. support. Moreover, ﬁrm i cannot have a mass point at the
upper bound of T j if ﬁrm j has a mass point there. 
Lemma 5. In equilibrium, it must hold that T 1 = T 2 = [p 0 , p h ] for p 0 < p h ≤ 1 . Lemma 6. In equilibrium, sup T 1 = sup T 2 = 1 . 
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f.2. Expected proﬁts 
Derivation of ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt 
• Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses a price p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p1 ) . 
Using (1) , as F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) = λ2 , ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁts at p = p 0 and when p → ̂ p1 are 
π1 ( p 0 , k ) = p 0 
[
1 − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
; (A.1)
lim 
p ↗ ̂  p1 
π1 ( p, k ) = ̂ p1 [σ − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]. (A.2)
• Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses a price p ∈ [ ̂  p1 , ̂  p2 ] . 
As 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) = μ( k , ¯k ) − μ( ¯k , ¯k ) , using F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) = λ2 , π1 ( ̂  p1 , ¯k ) = lim p ↗ ̂  p1 π1 ( p, k ) , as
iven in (A.2) . By Proposition 1 , F 2 ( ̂  p1 ) = 1 − σ and the expected proﬁt at p = ̂ p2 is 
π1 ( ̂  p2 , ¯k ) = ̂ p2 { (1 − λ2 ) − (1 − μ( k , ¯k ))[2(1 − σ − λ2 ) + σλ2 ] } . (A.3)
• Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses a price p ∈ ( ̂  p2 , 1] . 
As 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) = μ( k , ¯k ) − μ( ¯k , ¯k ) and F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) = λ2 , ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt becomes
π1 ( p, ¯k ) = p { (1 − F 2 ( p ))(2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) + σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))(2 − λ2 ) } . (A.4)
t can be checked that lim p ↘ ̂  p2 π1 ( p, ¯k ) = π1 ( ̂  p2 , ¯k ) as presented in (A.3) . 
Derivation of ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁt 
• Suppose ﬁrm 2 chooses a price p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p1 ) . 
By Proposition 1 , this price is associated with complexity k , so ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁt
s 
π2 ( p, k ) = p 
{
( F 1 ( ̂  p1 ) − F 1 ( p )) μ( k , k ) + (1 − F 1 ( ̂  p1 )) μ( k , ¯k ) 
+ (1 − σ) [F 1 ( ̂  p1 )(1 − μ( k , k )) + (1 − F 1 ( ̂  p1 ))(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]}. (A.5)
ith probability F 1 ( ̂  p1 ) , ﬁrm 1 chooses k , so that there are μ( k , k ) informed and
 − μ( k , k ) confused consumers. A share 1 − σ ( < σ) of the confused purchases from
rm 2, the less prominent seller. The experts purchase from ﬁrm 2 if ﬁrm 1’s price is
igher, which happens with probability F 1 ( ̂  p1 ) − F 1 ( p ) . With probability 1 − F 1 ( ̂  p1 ) , ﬁrm
 chooses ¯k , so there are μ( k , ¯k ) informed and 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) confused consumers. All experts
urchase from ﬁrm 2 as it oﬀers a lower price (ﬁrm 1 associates k¯ with prices higher than̂ 1 ) and so does a share 1 − σ of the confused consumers. The ﬁrst two terms in the curly
rackets capture the expected number of experts, whereas the term in square brackets
ives the exp ected numb er of confused consumers. Using μ( k , k ) = 1 and F 1 ( ̂  p1 ) = λ1 , it
ollows that, 
π2 ( p 0 , k ) = p 0 [1 − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] and 
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 lim 
p ↗ ̂  p1 
π2 ( p, k ) = ̂ p1 (1 − λ1 )[1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] . (A.6) 
• Suppose ﬁrm 2 chooses a price p ∈ [ ̂  p1 , ̂  p2 ] . 
By Proposition 1 , it associates this price with k . Then, ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁt is 
π2 ( p, k ) = p { (1 − F 1 ( p )) μ( k , ¯k ) + (1 − σ)[F 1 ( ̂  p1 )(1 − μ( k , k )) + (1 − F 1 ( ̂  p1 ))(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] } 
= p 
[
(1 − F 1 ( p )) μ( k , ¯k ) + (1 − σ)(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
. 
The logic behind the expression above is similar to the one for (A.5) . But when ﬁrm
1 uses k , it attracts all the experts, as it oﬀers a lower price. It is easy to check that
π2 ( ̂  p1 , ¯k ) = lim p ↗ ̂  p1 π2 ( p, k ) as given by (A.6) , and that the expected proﬁt at ̂ p2 is 
π2 ( ̂  p2 , k ) = ̂ p2 (1 − σ) [1 − λ1 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]. (A.7) 
• Suppose ﬁrm 2 chooses a price p ∈ ( ̂  p2 , 1] . 
By Proposition 1 , it associates this price with complexity level k¯ . Its expected proﬁt
is 
π2 ( p, ¯k ) = p 
{
(1 − F 1 ( p )) μ( ¯k , ¯k ) + (1 − σ)[F 1 ( ̂  p1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + (1 − F 1 ( ̂  p1 ))(1 − μ( ¯k , ¯k ))] 
}
= p 
{
(1 − F 1 ( p ))(2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) + (1 − σ)(2 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
}
. 
A.3. Equilibrium analysis 
Price ratios using the ﬁrms’ constant proﬁt conditions 
In equilibrium, ﬁrm i ’s expected proﬁt for any price-complexity combination ( p , k i ),
which is assigned positive density in equilibrium, must be constant. 
Using (A.1) –(A.3) , the constant proﬁt conditions for ﬁrm 1 give the following price
ratios expressed as functions of λ2 : 
p 0 ̂ p1 = σ − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 1 − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) and 
p 0 ̂ p2 = 1 − λ2 − [2(1 − σ)(1 − λ2 ) − σλ2 ](1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 1 − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
Using (A.6) and (A.7) , the constant proﬁt conditions of ﬁrm 2 lead to the following
price ratios expressed as functions of λ1 
p 0 ̂ p1 = (1 − λ1 )[1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 1 − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) and p 0 ̂ p2 = (1 − σ) 
[
1 − λ1 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
1 − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
. 
Equilibrium λ values 
We show below that equilibrium λ1 is always well deﬁned and that λ2 is well deﬁned
when Condition 2 holds. The expression for the λ’s is given in (2) . 
(i) It is easy to see that λ1 < σ and that λ2 > 1 − σ as 1 > σ(1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
(ii) We now check that λi ∈ (0, 1). 
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σ• As μ( k , ¯k ) + σ2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) > 0 , λ1 > 0 ⇔ 1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) > 0 ⇔ 1 / (1 −
μ( k , ¯k )) > σ(2 − σ) . This always holds as the RHS is lower than 1 and the LHS larger
than 1. 
• λ1 < 1 ⇔ (1 − σ)[1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] < μ( k , ¯k ) + σ2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ⇔ σ/ (1 −
σ) 
(
1 − σ + σ2 ) > (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) , which holds as the LHS is always larger than 1. 
• λ2 > 0, by the same argument used to show that λ1 > 0. 
• λ2 < 1 ⇔ ( 1 − σ) / [σ
(
1 − σ + σ2 )] > (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) , which gives Condition 2 . 
ass point at the upper bound 
If both ﬁrms’ price c.d.f.s were continuous everywhere (that is, if F 1 (1) = F 2 (1) = 1 ),
hen using (A.4) and (A.8) , it should be that π∗1 = σ(2 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) and π∗2 = (1 −
)(2 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . Then, the lower bounds of the supports should be 
p 1 0 = 
σ(2 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
> p 2 0 = 
(1 − σ)(2 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
. 
he inequality uses the fact that λ1 / (1 − σ) = λ2 /σ. 17 This contradicts Lemma 5 . Sup-
ose now that ﬁrm 2 had a mass point, so that F 2 (1) < 1. By Lemma 4 , it must be that
 1 (1) = 1 and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt is π∗2 = (1 − σ)(2 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . But then if ﬁrm 2 devi-
tes to p 1 0 , it makes proﬁts [1 − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] p 1 0 > (1 − σ)(2 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) .
 contradiction. 
So, it must be that ﬁrm 2’s price c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while ﬁrm 1 has a
ass point at p = 1 . Then, at p = 1 , ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt is 
π1 (1 , ¯k ) = σ
[
1 − λ2 μ( k , ¯k )) − (1 − λ2 ) μ( ¯k , ¯k ) 
]
= σ(2 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
quilibrium proﬁts and boundary prices 
We present the boundary price p 0 and the cut-oﬀ prices ̂ p1 and ̂ p2 as functions of λ2
nd check that they are consistent with Condition 1 . 
p 0 = 
σ(2 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
; 
̂ p1 = σ(2 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
σ − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
; 
̂ p2 = σ(2 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 1 − λ2 − [2(1 − σ − λ2 ) + σλ2 ](1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
onsider a situation where both ﬁrms randomize on prices and complexity, so λ2 ∈ (0, 1).
lso, by Proposition 1 , F 2 ( ̂  p1 ) = 1 − σ. As ̂ p1 < ̂ p2 , it must be that that F 2 ( ̂  p1 ) = 1 − σ <
2 = F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) (see Lemmas 3 and 4 ). 
• ̂ p1 > p 0 ⇔ 1 − σ > 0 , so it clearly holds. 
• ̂ p2 > p 0 ⇔ −λ2 − (1 − λ2 )(1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) < 0 which holds for λ2 ∈ (0, 1). 
• ̂ p1 < 1 ⇔ −σλ2 μ( k , ¯k )) < (2 σ − 1)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) which holds for λ2 ∈ (0, 1).17 It can then be reduced to 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) < (2 σ − λ2 ) / [2 σ − λ2 + σ(1 − σ)( σ − λ2 )] . But as λ2 > σ for 
≥ 1/2 the RHS is larger than 1, while the LHS is smaller than 1. 
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 • ̂ p2 < 1 ⇔ (2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1 )( λ2 − 1 ) < 0 . 
• ̂ p2 > ̂ p1 ⇔ σ − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) > (1 − λ2 ) − [2(1 − σ − λ2 ) + σλ2 ](1 −
μ( k , ¯k )) ⇔ 1 − σ − λ2 < 0 . 
Below we check that the equilibrium proﬁts are well deﬁned and present the equilib- 
rium values of the cut-oﬀ prices. 
 π∗1 given in (3) is well deﬁned. Clearly, 1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) > 0 . Also, under
Condition 2 , 
[
2 − σ − σ(3 − 2 σ + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ] > 0. It follows that π∗1 > 0 . Then, 
π∗1 < 1 as 
2 − σ − σ(3 − 2 σ + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) < 
1 
σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
⇔ [1 − (2 − σ) σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 2 + ( 2 σ − 1 ) σ2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 2 > 0 . 
 π∗2 given in (5) is well deﬁned. Under Condition 2 , as σ > 1/2, it follows that 2 −
σ − σ(σ2 − 2 σ + 3 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) > 0 . The, clearly π∗2 > 0 . Noting that π∗2 < π∗1 as 1 −
(1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) > 1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ⇔ σ > 1/2, it follows that π∗2 < 1 . 
 Below are ̂ p1 and ̂ p2 . 
̂ p1 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))[2 − σ − σ(3 − 2 σ + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
σ + ( σ3 − 3 σ2 + 2 σ − 1)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + σ(1 − σ)(1 − σ + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 2 ; 
(A.8) 
̂ p2 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))[2 − σ − σ(σ2 − 2 σ + 3 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] (1 − σ)[1 − (1 − σ)(2 + σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + σ(1 − σ)(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 2 ] . (A.9) 
Equilibrium pricing 
Firm 2’s c.d.f. is implicitly deﬁned by the constant proﬁt conditions of ﬁrm 1.
These conditions can be written using the expected proﬁts, which are presented in 
Appendix A.2 , and the equilibrium proﬁt π∗1 deﬁned in (3) . Let 
F 2 ( p ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
F L 2 ( p ) for p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p2 ) 
F M 2 ( p ) for p ∈ [ ̂  p2 , ̂  p1 ] 
F H 2 ( p ) for p ∈ ( ̂  p1 , 1) 
. 
Below we identify piece-wise the c.d.f., using the equilibrium λ2 in (2) . 
For prices in [p 0 , ̂  p1 ) , using the constant proﬁt condition of ﬁrm 1 we obtain 
1 − F L 2 ( p ) = (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
(1 − σ)[1 − σ − σ(1 − σ + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + 
π∗1 
p 
. 
For prices in the middle range [ ̂  p1 , ̂  p2 ] , the constant proﬁt condition leads to 
1 − F M 2 ( p ) = − (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
μ( k , ¯k ) 
[ 1 − (1 − σ)(2 − λ2 ) ] + π
∗
1 
pμ( k , ¯k ) 
= − (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
μ( k , ¯k ) 
[
1 − (1 − σ) 2 − σ − σ(3 − 2 σ + σ
2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
+ π
∗
1 
pμ( k , ¯k ) 
. 
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p  For prices in the high range ( ̂  p2 , 1] , the constant proﬁt condition requires 
1 − F H 2 ( p ) = −
(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
(2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) σ(2 − λ2 ) + 
π∗1 
p (2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) 
= − (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
(2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) 
σ[2 − σ − σ(3 − 2 σ + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + 
π∗1 
p (2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) . 
It is straightforward to check that F 2 ( p ) is continuous on [ p 0 , 1] and strictly increasing.
To pin down ﬁrm 1’s c.d.f., we use the constant proﬁt conditions for ﬁrm 2, the
xpected proﬁts presented earlier in this appendix, and the equilibrium proﬁt π∗2 deﬁned
n (5) . As before, there are three diﬀerent price ranges to be considered, so that 
F 1 ( p ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
F L 1 ( p ) for p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p2 ) 
F M 1 ( p ) for p ∈ [ ̂  p2 , ̂  p1 ] 
F H 1 ( p ) for p ∈ ( ̂  p1 , 1] 
. 
We proceed to identify piece-wise the c.d.f., using the equilibrium λ1 in (2) . 
For prices in [p 0 , ̂  p1 ) , the constant proﬁt condition of ﬁrm 2 implies that 
1 − F L 1 ( p ) = (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
σ[σ − (1 − σ)( σ2 − σ + 1)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + 
π∗2 
p 
. 
For prices in the middle range [ ̂  p1 , ̂  p2 ] , the constant proﬁt condition leads to 
1 − F M 1 ( p ) = −
(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
μ( k , ¯k ) 
(1 − σ)[σ − (1 − σ)( σ2 − σ + 1)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + 
π∗2 
pμ( k , ¯k ) 
, 
hile for prices in the high range ( ̂  p2 , 1] , to 
1 − F H 1 ( p ) = −
(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1 
(1 − σ)[1 + σ − (1 − σ)(2 + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
+ π
∗
2 
p (2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) . 
It is easy to check that F 1 ( p ) is continuous on [ p 0 , 1) and strictly increasing. Firm 1
as a mass point at p = 1 , 
φ ≡ 1 − F H 1 (1) = 
( 2 σ − 1 ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ∈ (0 , 1) for σ > 1 / 2 . 
.4. Equilibrium analysis for high prominence 
This subsection focuses on a situation where Condition 2 does not hold. 
ro of of Prop osition 3. When ﬁrm 1 cho oses a price p ∈ [p h 0 , ̂  ph 1 ) , it uses complexity level
 . Then, ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt in this range is πh 1 ( p, k ) = p 
(
1 − F h 2 ( p ) 
)
, and πh 1 ( p h 0 , k ) =
 
h 
0 and lim p ↗ ̂  ph 1 π
h 
1 ( p, k ) = σ̂ ph 1 . When ﬁrm 1 chooses a price p ∈ [ ̂  ph 1 , 1) , it uses k¯ . Then,
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 its expected proﬁt is 
πh 1 ( p, ¯k ) = p 
[
(1 − F h 2 ( p )) μ( k , ¯k ) + σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
, 
so that π1 ( ̂  ph 1 , ¯k ) = σ̂ ph 1 . The constant proﬁt condition of ﬁrm 1 implies that p h 0 = σ̂ ph 1 .
When ﬁrm 2 chooses a price p ∈ [p h 0 , ̂  ph 1 ) , it uses k . As μ( k , k ) = 1 and F h 1 ( ̂  ph 1 ) = λh 1 , ﬁrm
2’s expected proﬁt is 
πh 2 ( p, k ) = p 
[
λh 1 − F h 1 ( p ) + (1 − λh 1 ) μ( k , ¯k ) + (1 − σ)(1 − λh 1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
. 
It then follows that, 
πh 2 ( p h 0 , k ) = p h 0 
[
1 − σ(1 − λh 1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
and 
lim 
p ↗ ̂  ph 1 
πh 2 ( p, k ) = ̂  ph 1 (1 − λh 1 ) 
[
1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]. 
Combining p h 0 = σ̂ ph 1 with the constant proﬁt condition of ﬁrm 2, we obtain the value for
λh 1 . When ﬁrm 2 chooses a price p ∈ [ ̂  ph 1 , 1) , it uses k . Then, ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁt is 
πh 2 ( p, k ) = p 
[
(1 − F h 1 ( p )) μ( k , ¯k ) + (1 − σ)(1 − λh 1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
. 
By Lemma 4 , both ﬁrms cannot have a mass point at p = 1 . If F h 1 (1) = 1 , then p h 0 =
π∗h 1 = σ(1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) / [1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] and F h 2 (1) < 0 , a contradiction. Hence,
it must be that ﬁrm 1 has an atom at p = 1 and ﬁrm 2’s c.d.f. is continuous on [p h 0 , 1] .
F h 2 (1) = 1 implies that, in equilibrium, ̂ ph 1 = (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) and ﬁrms’ proﬁts and p h 0 follow.
The mass point in ﬁrm 1’s price c.d.f. is 
φh ≡ 1 − F h 1 (1) = 
σ2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) < 1 , 
and consistency requires that F h 1 (1) ≤ σ, which is the case whenever 
(1 − σ) /σ(1 − σ + σ2 ) ≤ (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
But this is exactly the reverse of Condition 2 . 
Equilibrium pricing 
To identify ﬁrm 2’s c.d.f. we use the constant proﬁt conditions for ﬁrm 1. The expected
proﬁts are presented in Section 4 and the equilibrium proﬁt π∗h 1 is deﬁned in (6) . It follows
that 
F h 2 ( p ) = 
{ 
F hL 2 ( p ) for p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  ph 1 ) 
F hH 2 ( p ) for p ∈ [ ̂  ph 1 , 1) 
, 
where 
1 − F hL 2 ( p ) = 
σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
p 
and 1 − F hH 2 ( p ) = 
σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
μ( k , ¯k ) 
(
1 
p 
− 1 
)
. 
It is easy to check that F hL 2 ( ̂  ph 1 ) = F hH 2 ( ̂  ph 1 ) = 1 − σ as ̂ ph 1 = 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) . 
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dTo pin down ﬁrm 1’s c.d.f. we use the constant proﬁt conditions for ﬁrm 2. Then, 
F h 1 ( p ) = 
{ 
F hL 1 ( p ) for p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  ph 1 ) 
F hH 1 ( p ) for p ∈ [ ̂  ph 1 , 1] 
, 
here 
1 − F hL 1 ( p ) = 
σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
[
1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
p 
+ σ
]
and 
1 − F hH 1 ( p ) = 
σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
μ( k , ¯k )[1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
[
1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
p 
− (1 − σ) 
]
. 
t is easy to check that F hL 1 ( ̂  ph 1 ) = F hH 1 ( ̂  ph 1 ) = λh 1 . Firm 1’s atom at p = 1 is given by 
φh ≡ 1 − F hH 1 (1) = 
σ2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
.5. The role of prominence 
Suppose that Condition 2 holds. 
Let ν1 ≡ [1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] > 0 and ν2 ≡
[
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ] > 0. 
Note that d ν1 / d σ < 0 and d ν2 / d σ > 0. Then, 
dλ1 
dσ
= 1 ( ν2 ) 2 
{[
−ν1 + (1 − σ) dν1 
dσ
]
ν2 − dν2 
dσ
(1 − σ) ν1 
}
< 0; 
dλ2 
dσ
= 1 ( ν1 ) 2 
{[
ν2 + σ
dν2 
dσ
]
ν1 − dν1 
dσ
σν2 
}
> 0 . 
uppose now that Condition 2 does not hold. dλh 2 /dσ = 0 as λh 2 = 1 . Let ν3 ≡ [1 −
(1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] > 0 and ν4 ≡ [1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] > 0. Note that d ν3 / d σ > 0 and
 ν4 / d σ < 0. Then, 
dλh 1 
dσ
= 1 ( ν3 ) 2 
{[
−ν4 + (1 − σ) dν4 
dσ
]
ν3 − dν3 
dσ
( 1 − σ) ν4 
}
. 
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 Industry proﬁt for relatively high levels of prominence 
Consider Proposition 3 . Using (6) , industry proﬁt is 
π∗h 1 + π∗h 2 = σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
2 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
Diﬀerentiating industry proﬁt w.r.t. σ, we obtain 
σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 2[1 − 2 σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] + σ
2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) {1 + [1 + (1 − σ) 2 ](1 − μ( k , ¯k )) }[
1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]2 . 
As (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ≤ 1 / 2 , the ﬁrst term in the numerator is positive and then d ( π∗h 1 +
π∗h 2 ) /dσ > 0 . 
Proof of Corollary 2. (i) Suppose that Condition 2 holds and consider the equilib- 
rium in Proposition 2 . From (3) and (5) , π∗1 > π∗2 ⇔ (2 σ − 1)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) > 0 which
holds for σ > 1/2. Suppose that Condition 2 does not hold and consider the equi-
librium in Proposition 3 . Using (6) , it is easy to see that π∗h 1 > π∗h 2 as the frac-
tion in π∗h 2 is smaller than one. (ii) Suppose that Condition 2 holds. Consider the
equilibrium price c.d.f.s in Appendix A.2 . (a) For prices p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p1 ) , dF L 1 ( p ) /dp =
π∗2 /p 
2 < dF L 2 ( p ) /dp = π∗1 /p 2 using p oint (i) ab ove. As F L 1 ( p 0 ) = F L 2 ( p 0 ) = 0, then
F L 1 ( p ) < F L 2 ( p ) . Also lim p ↗ ̂  p1 F L 1 ( p ) < lim p ↗ ̂  p1 F L 2 ( p ) . (b) For p ∈ [ ̂  p1 , ̂  p2 ] , dF M 1 ( p ) /dp =
π∗2 /μ( k , ¯k ) p 2 < dF M 2 ( p ) /dp = π∗1 /μ( k , ¯k ) p 2 . Point (a) and continuity of F i on [ p 0 , 1) imply
that F M 1 ( ̂  p1 ) < F M 2 ( ̂  p1 ) . So, F M 1 ( p ) < F M 2 ( p ) in this range. (c) Consider [ ̂  p2 , 1] . From
part (b) then F M 1 ( ̂  p2 ) < F M 2 ( ̂  p2 ) . By continuity, lim p ↘ ̂  p2 F H 1 ( p ) < lim p ↘ ̂  p2 F H 2 ( p ) . As
dF H 1 ( p ) /dp = π∗2 / (2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) p 2 <dF H 2 ( p ) /dp = π∗1 / (2 μ( k , ¯k ) − 1) p 2 , F H 1 ( p ) < F H 2 ( p ) .
Combining (a)-(c), F 1 ( p ) < F 2 ( p ) on [ p 0 , 1], and the price of ﬁrm 1 ﬁrst order stochas-
tically dominates that ﬁrm 2. 
Suppose that Condition 2 does not hold. Consider the equilibrium price c.d.f.s 
in Appendix A.4 . For prices p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  ph 1 ) , 
(
dF hL 1 ( p ) /dp 
)
/ 
(
dF hL 2 ( p ) /dp 
)
= [1 − σ(1 −
μ( k , ¯k ))] / [1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] < 1. As F hL 1 ( p h 0 ) = F hL 2 ( p h 0 ) = 0, then F hL 1 ( p ) <
F hL 2 ( p ) in this range. For prices in [ ̂  ph 1 , 1] , 
(
dF hH 1 ( p ) /dp 
)
/ 
(
dF hH 2 ( p ) /dp 
)
= [1 − σ(1 −
μ( k , ¯k ))] / [1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] < 1. As F h 1 and F h 2 are continuous at ̂ ph 1 , then
F hH 1 ( p ) < F hH 2 ( p ) in this range, too. So, F h 1 ( p ) < F h 2 ( p ) on [p h 0 , 1] and the price of
ﬁrm 1 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates that of ﬁrm 2. (iii) The ranking of the aver-
age prices follows from (ii) as E( p i ) = 
∫ ∞ 
0 (1 − F i ( p i )) dp i = 
∫ 1 
p 0 
(1 − F i ( p i )) dp i + p 0 when
Condition 2 holds and E( p i ) = 
∫ 1 
p h 0 
(1 − F h i ( p i )) dp i + p h 0 when Condition 2 does not hold.
(iv) When Condition 2 is satisﬁed λ1 = σ(1 − σ) /λ2 , so λ1 < λ2 ⇔ σ > (1 − σ)(1 −
σ + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) which holds for σ > 1/2. When Condition 2 does not hold, it is easy
to see from Proposition 3 that λh 1 < 1 . 
Proof of Corollary 3. First we compare the cut-oﬀ prices. Suppose Condition 2 holds. 
Using (A.8) and (A.9) in Appendix A.2 , ̂ p1 < ̂ p2 ⇔ 
I. Chioveanu / International Journal of Industrial Organization 63 (2019) 551–582 579 
T  
d  
a
 
1  
l  
w  
[
L  
p
w  
P
F
I
 
t  
a  
A
a
A
 
r  − μ( k , ¯k )(2 σ − 1)[1 − (1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
σ + ( σ3 − 3 σ2 + 2 σ − 1)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + σ(1 − σ)(1 − σ + σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 2 < 0 . 
he inequality follows from the fact that, for σ ∈ (1/2, 1), both the numerator and the
enominator are positive. The sum of the ﬁrst two terms in the denominator is positive
s (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ≤ 1 / 2 . 
If Condition 2 does not hold, ﬁrm 2 uses k for all prices on [p h 0 , 1] and ̂ ph 1 = 1 − μ( k , ¯k ) <
 . Next we compare the ﬁrms’ average prices conditional on using the lowest complexity
evel. Suppose Condition 2 holds. F 2 is continuous on [ p 0 , 1] so that F 2 ( p ) = F 2 ( p | p < 1) ,
hereas F 1 is continuous on [ p 0 , 1), but has an atom at p = 1 , φ = ( 2 σ − 1 ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) /
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] . Using the price c.d.f.s in Appendix A.2 , we can show that 
F 1 ( p | p < 1) = F 1 ( p ) 
F 1 (1) 
= F 1 ( p ) 
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) = F 2 ( p ) . 
et G ( p ) = F 1 ( p | p < 1). Note that F 1 ( p | p < ̂ p1 ) = G ( p | p < ̂ p1 ) . This is because F 1 ( p |
 < ̂ p1 ) = F 1 ( p )/ F 1 ( ̂  p1 ) and G ( p | p < ̂ p1 ) = F 1 ( p )/ F 1 (1) G ( ̂  p1 ) . But then, 
G ( p | p < ̂ p1 ) = F 2 ( p | p < ̂ p1 ) > F 2 ( p | p < ̂ p2 ) , 
here the inequality follows from the fact that ̂ p1 < ̂ p2 and F 2 is a well-deﬁned c.d.f.
utting together the expressions above, it follows that 
F 1 ( p | p < ̂ p1 ) > F 2 ( p | p < ̂ p2 ) . 
inally, note that 
E( p 1 | p 1 < ̂ p1 ) = ∫ ̂ p1 
p 0 
(1 − F 1 ( p | p < ̂ p1 )) dp − p 0 ; 
E( p 2 | p 2 < ̂ p2 ) = ∫ ̂ p1 
p 0 
(1 − F 2 ( p | p < ̂ p2 )) dp + ∫ ̂ p2 ̂ p1 (1 − F 2 ( p | p < ̂ p2 )) dp − p 0 . 
t is then easy to see that E( p 1 | p 1 < ̂ p1 ) < E( p 2 | p 2 < ̂ p2 ) . 
Suppose now that Condition 2 does not hold. F h 2 is continuous on [p h 0 , 1] so
hat F h 2 ( p ) = F h 2 ( p | p < 1) , whereas F h 1 is continuous on [p h 0 , 1) , but has an atom
t p = 1 , φh = σ2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) / [1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] . Using the price c.d.f.s in
ppendix A.4 , 
F h 1 ( p | p < 1) = 
F h 1 ( p ) 
1 − φh = F 
h 
1 ( p ) 
1 − σ( 1 − σ) (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
1 − σ(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) = F 
h 
2 ( p ) , 
nd an argument similar to the one above applies as ̂ ph 1 < 1 and φh > 0. 
.6. Proof of Condition 1 
This section shows that Condition 1 must hold in any equilibrium where both ﬁrms
andomize on both prices and complexity levels. Suppose instead that p 0 < ̂ p2 ≤ ̂ p1 < 1 .
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 Then consistency requires that F i ( ̂  pi ) = λi ∈ (0 , 1) and, by Proposition 1 , F i ( ̂  pj ) = s i .
Firm 1’s expected proﬁt is presented below, followed by ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁt. 
• Suppose that ﬁrm 1 chooses a price p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p2 ) . By Proposition 1 , it associates it with
k and its expected proﬁt is π1 ( p , k ) presented in (1) . Expression (A.1) still gives π1 ( p 0 ,
k ), while now lim p ↗ ̂  p2 π1 ( p, k ) = ̂ p2 (1 − λ2 ) [1 − (1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]. 
• Suppose that ﬁrm 1 chooses a price p ∈ [ ̂  p2 , ̂  p1 ] . By Proposition 1 , it associates it with
k and its expected proﬁt is 
π1 ( p, k ) = p 
[
(1 − F 2 ( p )) μ( k , ¯k ) + σ(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
. 
The expected number of confused consumers (given by the second term in square 
brackets) is the same as in expression (1) and ﬁrm 1 serves a fraction σ of them.
Firm 1 serves informed consumers only if ﬁrm 2 chooses a higher price, in which case
there are μ( k , ¯k ) of them. This happens with probability 1 − F 2 ( p ) and gives the ﬁrst
term in square brackets. It is easy to check that π1 ( ̂  p2 , k ) = lim p ↗ ̂  p2 π1 ( p, k ) . As by
Proposition 1 F 2 ( ̂  p1 ) = 1 − σ, π1 ( ̂  p1 , k ) = ̂ p1 σ[1 − λ2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]. 
Using the constant proﬁt requirements, it follows that 
p 0 ̂ p1 = σ
[
1 − λ2 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
]
1 − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
and p 0 ̂ p2 = (1 − λ2 ) 
[
1 − (1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]
1 − (1 − σ)(1 − λ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 
. 
• Suppose that ﬁrm 2 chooses a price p ∈ [p 0 , ̂  p2 ) . By Proposition 1 , it associates it with
k and its expected proﬁt is given by (A.5) . Expression (A.6) still gives π2 ( p 0 , k ) and
now lim p ↗ ̂  p2 π2 ( p, k ) = ̂ p2 [(1 − σ) − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ]. 
• Suppose that ﬁrm 2 chooses a price p ∈ [ ̂  p2 , ̂  p1 ] . By Proposition 1 , it associates it with
k¯ . Firm 2’s expected proﬁt is 
π2 ( p, ¯k ) = p 
[
( λ1 − F 1 ( p )) μ( k , ¯k ) + (1 − λ1 ) μ( ¯k , ¯k ) 
]
+ p (1 − σ)[λ1 (1 − μ( k , ¯k )) + (1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( ¯k , ¯k ))] } . 
Then, π2 ( ̂  p2 , ¯k ) = lim p ↗ ̂  p2 π2 ( p, k ) , and π2 ( ̂  p1 , ¯k ) = ̂ p1 { (1 − λ1 ) + [λ1 (1 − σ) − 2 σ(1 −
λ1 )](1 − μ( k , ¯k )) } . 
Using the constant proﬁt requirements, we obtain 
p 0 ̂ p1 = 1 − λ1 − [2 σ(1 − λ1 ) − (1 − σ) λ1 ](1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 1 − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) ; 
p 0 ̂ p2 = (1 − σ) − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) 1 − σ(1 − λ1 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
Combining the price ratios as functions of λ1 and λ2 , we obtain 
λ1 = 
(1 − σ)[1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) and λ2 = 
σ[1 − (1 − σ2 )(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 
1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) . 
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H  s ̂ p2 ≤ ̂ p1 , by Proposition 1 , it must be that λ2 ≤ 1 − σ as F 2 ( ̂  p2 ) ≤ F 2 ( ̂  p1 ) . But then
e reached a contradiction as 
1 − σ − λ2 = − (2 σ − 1)[1 − σ(1 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k ))] 1 − σ(2 − σ)(1 − μ( k , ¯k )) < 0 as σ > 1 / 2 . 
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